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ESSENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY




N THE PRESENT PAPER we are suggesting not only that a clinical
entity, known as essential incompatibility, can cause a marriage to
be null and void, but also that it can be verified factually to meet the
requirements of the canonical law of evidence.
We are going to try to demonstrate that there can be fixed person-
ality structures which, relative to each other, make it impossible for two
parties to a marriage to enter a valid union. The invalidity is alleged to
be present because of incapacities on the part of both, relative to each
other, to fulfill one or more of the essential elements or terms of the
marriage contract. Invalidity is considered to result not from the person-
ality structure of just one of the parties (or of both of the parties, con-
sidered separately) but precisely from the interaction of both parties
together-an interaction already basically present at the time of the
wedding which prevents them from being able to fulfill one or more of
the essential elements of the marriage contract.
We wish to emphasize very strongly that we are not examining the
area of matrimonial consent. We are not concerned with the ability or
lack of ability of either or both parties to place valid human consent to
t Presented at the annual convention of the Eastern Regional Conference of the
Canon Law Society of America, Niagara Falls, New York, April 16, 1970.
* S.T.B., Gregorian University, Rome, 1939; J.C.D., Catholic University of
America, 1949; LL.B., St. John's University, -. Presiding Judge of the Tribunal
of the Diocese of Brooklyn. Admitted to practice before the New York and
federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States.
** J.C.D., Gregorian University, Rome, 1959. Defender of the Marriage Board
of the Tribunal of the Diocese of Brooklyn.
the marriage contract. In our discussion this
ability to consent is presumed to be both
possible and actual. The insight of the in-
dividuals is at least adequate; their freedom
of will is sufficient; and the maturity of
their judgment (if we wish for the sake of
clarity to distinguish it from the combined
action of intellect and will) is adequately
proportionate to the nature of the marriage
contract. In other words, "due discretion"
is present. We are not talking about the
"lack of due discretion."
We believe that an action based on "es-
sential incompatibility" can be introduced,
pleaded, and a judgment issued without the
question of matrimonial consent or due dis-
cretion ever arising.
THE BASIC PRINCIPLE: "ONE CANNOT
OBLIGE HIMSELF To Do THE
IMPOSSIBLE"
This basic principle, Nemo potest ad
impossible obligari, is not new in the his-
tory of law. As a matter of fact, it is Rule
6 of the Rules of Canon Law which are to
be found at the end of the Liber Sextus of
the Decretals of Boniface VIII. Cicognani
claims, although others deny, that the 88
Rules of Law of Boniface had the same
force of ecclesiastical law as the Decretals
which preceded them.1 loannes Andreae
who wrote the glossa ordinaria to the
Rules demonstrated how this principle, that
one cannot bind himself to the impossible,
was well established in Roman Law.
In his glossa Ioannes Andreae ex-
plains the rule to mean that one cannot
1 A. CICOGNANI, CANON LAW 311 (1934).
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oblige himself to do something (1) which
is morally wrong, (2) which is legally for-
bidden or (3) which factually cannot be
accomplished, e.g., to touch the moon with
the finger or to transport a church from
Bologna to Paris. At least in regard to the
last examples of an impossibility, we won-
der if Joannes Andreae would still be of the
same mind.
The Code of Canon Law makes no spe-
cific mention of this rule of law. It is, how-
ever, implied in various canons. Important
for our purposes is Canon 1086, the canon
on impotence. This canon has always been
interpreted as applying exclusively to an in-
capacity, generally physical but possibly
psychic, to perform the marital act of copu-
lation.
Generally, moralists have agreed that
one could not oblige himself to do the im-
possible. It is particularly in the field of
moral theology that we are acquainted with
this principle. Moralists also agreed that
when something became impossible the
obligation ceased. They found no difficulty
in applying the principle not only to phys-
ical but also to moral impossibility.
We wish to reiterate and to emphasize
that one cannot be obliged to do the im-
possible. He cannot oblige himself to this
nor can he be obliged to it by another per-
son. What a person cannot be thus bound
or obliged to, neither can he give a right to
another person (since, in the hypothesis, it
is actually "impossible"). Another way of
saying this is, that if a person cannot fulfill
a particular thing, then he cannot be bound
to it by another nor can he bind himself to
it (at least while it is impossible for him).
Therefore, if a person cannot fulfill an es-
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sential element of marriage, then, as a sub-
ject, as a person, for the duration of his
incapacity, he cannot contract marriage.
That is, at that time he is not the proper
subject of the marriage contract since he
cannot give or fulfill an essential require-
ment of the contract.
While Canon 1086 of the Code was gen-
erally considered to limit the concept of
impotence to an incapacity to copulate, it
appears that only in recent years was ca-
nonical jurisprudence ready to acknowledge
as invalidating a more general incapacity
to perform any of the other essentials of
the marriage contract. The first clear state-
ment in reported cases of the more general
principle appears to have been made by
Sabattani in a case which involved a nym-
phomaniac. 2 Sabattani stated that if she
was incapable of fulfilling the essential
property of fidelity the marriage would be
invalid. The same principle of the invali-
dating effect of the incapacity to perform
an essential term of the marriage contract
was implied as "obiter dicta" by Heard '
and by Mattioli. 4 Pinna in 1963 seemed to
continue to restrict the concept of canon-
ical impotence to an incapacity to perform
the marital act. 5 More recent Rotal deci-
sions appear to accept it as established that
there can be a wider radical or constitu-
tional incapacity, even of a psychic nature,
which causes invalidity. In a decision of
December 2, 1967 Lefebre declared that a
certain homosexual, the defendant in the
2 49 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 503 (1957).
3 46 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 85 (1954).
4 49 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 774 (1957); 48 S.R.
Rotae Decisiones 873 (1956).
5 Monitor Ecclesiasticus 413 (1965).
action, was incapable of binding himself to
the essential obligations of permanency and
fidelity in the marriage contract with con-
sequent nullity to the contract itself.6 In an
unpublished review of the same action be-
fore the Rota, Pompedda on October 6,
1969 also found that this marriage of the
said homosexual was invalid because his
condition was opposed to the essential end
of the marriage, the procreation of children.
In this case there was no question of an
incapacity to consummate the marriage
physically nor was the case argued because
of the lack of consent based on an inten-
tion against the interests of children. Pom-
pedda argued that no one is able to oblige
himself to do what he cannot do. Although
we do not at this time have the "in facto"
section of this decision, Pompedda can be
understood as saying that this particular
homosexual was incapable of giving the
real "ius ad prolem." Pompedda in this de-
cision specifically states that there is a
more general incapacity to contract mar-
riage than that found in Canon 1086.
Much has already been written about
this more general constitutional incapacity
to marriage. Among the European authors
of special note are A. C. Jemolo and Peter
Huizing who are quoted by Lefebre in his
decision of December 2, 1967.7 In our
country, special credit must be given to
J. Richard Keating who applied the con-
cept to a suggested solution of the case of
a sociopath.8 With regret, it must be ad-
mitted that some writers continue to con-
6 Monitor Ecclesiasticus 473 (1968).
7 Id.
8 Keating, Sociopathic Personality, 25 THE JUR-
IST 429 (1965).
fuse this broader radical incapacity founded
in the personality structure with an inabil-
ity to use "due discretion" which is neces-
sary to give matrimonial consent. To dis-
tinguish the two, one can imagine a man,
physically impotent who is totally unaware
of his incapacitating condition. On the day
of his wedding his consent in all essentials
is equal to that of any other man entering
marriage. So too we say that there are per-
sons whose personality structures, relative
to each other, are such that they cannot
fulfill the marriage contract but at the time
of the marriage they can be totally unaware
of their constitutional defects.
We believe that the axiom that one can-
not oblige himself to the impossible is
sound and should be accepted as a basic
canonical principle of jurisprudence. St.
Thomas maintains that it is not fitting
(conveniens) to hold a person to a contract
which he is incapable to perform. 9 Our
Anglo-American common law states that
a promise imposes no duty if performance
of the promise is impossible because of
facts existing when the promise is made
and the promisor neither knows nor has
reason to know of the impossibility.'" For
the one who knowingly promises the im-
possible, a breach of contract suit offers a
remedy in common law for damages but
specific performance remains impossible.
The Decretals refused an action of nullity
to a plaintiff who knowingly entered mar-
riage with a woman who was impotent, but
it regarded the marriage as invalid with
9 IV SENT., dist. 34, q. I, art. 2.
art. 2.
10 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 456 (1932).
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the admonition to the parties to live as
brother and sister.
Assuming then that one should not be
held to a marriage contract when he was
incapable of fulfilling one or more of the
essential elements of the contract, we say
that there are individuals, considered solely
as individuals, whose rigid personality
problems or defects of the psychological or
moral order (in distinction to the purely
physical order) prevent them from being
able to assume one or more of the essential
elements of marriage. Such persons would
be considered, at least at that particular
time, incapable of contracting marriage
with any one because they are incapable,
at that particular time of fulfilling the es-
sentials of the contract. (Possibly with ex-
tensive care or maybe even with the pas-
sage of time which normally brings its own
learning experiences and changes in per-
sonal growth such an individual might be-
come truly capable of marriage.)
Some descriptive terms that have been
used for this ground for invalidity are (with
differences and limitations according to
various writers) "moral impotence," "rad-
ical incapacity," and "personal constitu-
tional incapacity." The expression "psychic
impotence" has also been used but this is
confusing because this term for years has
been used by canonists to signify an inca-
pacity caused by psychic factors to perform
properly the specific act of copulation. For
our purposes hereafter in this paper we will
use the expression Constitutional Incapacity
to signify this broader inability, based rad-
ically in the structure of the personality,
which makes it impossible for one to fulfill
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one or more of the essential terms of the
marriage contract.
PRESENT ESSENTIALS OF MARRIAGE
CONTRACT
It is commonly held by canonists that the
essential object of the marriage contract is
the right to the basic ius in corpus to acts
suitable for the generation of children. In
addition, the law is clear that the essential
properties of ius in corpus are perma-
nence" and exclusiveness.1 2 Therefore, if
one does not consentually give the full right
or eliminates from his consent these prop-
erties of permanence and exclusiveness,
then he is contracting invalidly.
In accordance with the general principle
stated above, if one is unable to fulfill the
right to marital copulation, he cannot as-
sume the obligation to it. This is evident
from Canon 1086 which accepted the no-
tion that a personal defect, not one affect-
ing the intellect or will (or consent as a
human act) does prevent a person from
being able to assume the essential obliga-
tion of marriage (and thus from being able
to give an essential right of marriage).
Therefore, says Canon 1086, the man who
is permanently (incurably) and absolutely
impotent cannot validly marry. Canon
1086 recognizes that invalidity can also
arise by nature when a specific couple is so
constituted physically or psychically that
they are unable to have marital relations
with each other, although they would be
able to have such relations with other pos-
11 Canon 1013, § 2.
12 Canon 1081, § 2.
sible spouses. This latter incapacity is
known as relative impotence and will be of
interest in our main thesis to be expounded.
One essential property of the basic mar-
riage right is permanence. A possible ex-
ample of the constitutional incapacity to
fulfill the essential property of permanence
could be the man who is gravely and deeply
homosexual. In a recent decision of Oc-
tober 6, 1969, written by Pompedda, the
Rota based its judgment of invalidity of
the fact that the man in question was in-
capable of giving and accepting the "ius in
corpus" such as is required by natural law.
The phraseology of this decision could also
be used to explain our approach, namely
that the person himself is not the subject
of marriage because of a constitutional or
radical personal incapacity. This Rota de-
cision says that the object of marriage in
the case was lacking, but adds that the
reason for this was that the one contracting
was "incapable of transferring and accept-
ing." It also states that in this person there
was a "deorientation of the whole person"
and that in proving this and other such
cases one must be able to establish with
moral certitude the incapacity of the one
contracting, his incapacity to enter a valid
marriage. Following this reasoning, we
could add that should a person's constitu-
tion or radical orientation show a perma-
nent inability to stay with any woman in
a continued social marital relationship,
then, at least theoretically, we could state
that he had a radical incapacity to fulfill
the essential property of permanence.
The other essential property of the basic
marriage right is fidelity or exclusiveness.
Following our general principle that one
cannot oblige himself to the impossible, we
claim that one who is incapable of fidelity
is incapable of marriage. An example of
such a case is the decision of Sabattani. 13
Here the Rota stated, "When nymphoma-
nia reaches a stage of this kind (its most
serious and permanent stage) and there is
no way of curing it, it is not to be doubted
that the marriage is invalid. For the woman
so afflicted ought to be said to be incapable
of assuming the obligation of fidelity be-
cause of her very constitutional make up."'14
In this connection, the decision of Mat-
tiolil5 is also interesting. He speaks of per-
sons who because of an illness are at times
affected mentally but who at other times
are quite well. This decision states that if
the specific illness is one which will defi-
nitely get worse as time goes on, then the
person suffering from it natura sua, by
his own nature, by nature itself, is unable
to fulfill, for example, a permanent con-
tract. This decision also implies that there
can be a constitutional incapacity in the
individual for a valid marriage apart from
that individual's intellectual or volitional
ability to contract.1"
In all of these cases, we have an appli-
cation of the principle-that no one can be
obliged to do what is for him impossible.
When the constitutional incapacity is in ref-
erence to the basic right of marriage or
either or both of its essential properties,
nullity results.
We are naturally so aware of the fact
that a subject for marriage is needed, i.e.,
13 49 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 503 (1957).
14 Id.
t5 48 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 873 (1956).
16 Id.
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persons get married, that we can tend to
overlook the fact that the persons attempt-
ing marriage must be "marriageable." So,
for example, the law need not state in an
explicit way that the subjects of marriage
must be a man and a woman. We can fur-
ther say that the Code of Canon Law need
not explicitly state that the subject of mar-
riage be a person basically capable, as an
individual, of living as a married person.
(We are here, for argument, limiting our-
selves to the traditionally accepted essen-
tials of marriage.)
Coming back to our line of reasoning,
the incapacity to assume and to give is a
result of the fact that the person cannot
fulfill what he wishes to assume and to give.
This inability to fulfill, which we call con-
stitutional incapacity, is itself the result of
the radical constitutional and fairly perma-
nent makeup of the person. Thus, it is this
personality, constituted as such, which per-
manently excludes (morally at least) such
fulfillment. Therefore we have no "subject"
of marriage, at least at the time in ques-
tion. This considers nullity from the inca-
pacity of just one of the parties. Our thesis
extends this concept by applying it to the
interrelationship of two particular persons.
THE CLINICAL FINDINGS OF EXPERTS
Let us first define the terms. According
to Dr. Walter J. Coville, a psychologist,
"essential incompatibility" is a radical in-
capacity so deeply rooted in the personality
structures of the married couple that it is
impossible for them to live a common life
together. Dr. Coville explains that this
deeply rooted incapacity is manifested by
a life long history of periodic or constant
maladjustment and/or by psychological test
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findings and this structural incapacity is
resistive to basic change by prolonged ther-
apy even though there might be some im-
provement on the functioning level by such
therapy. This is the scientific definition of
psychologists and psychiatrists. We, as can-
onists, note in particular that essential in-
compatibility makes a common life impos-
sible. Although some therapy might be
used, there is a basic continuance of the
maladjustment, making common life im-
possible at least in a realistic human sense.
The parties may continue to live under the
same roof, perhaps even in the same bed,
but as total strangers. Essential incompat-
ibility could still be found under these cir-
cumstances.
To prove that "essential incompatibility"
does exist, let us quote from a number of
experts who have appeared in the capacity
of psychiatric experts before the Tribunal
of Brooklyn:
Dr. C. Joseph Chiarello, psychiatrist: There
are couples who have sufficient power of
discretion or maturity at the time of con-
tracting marriage but who later in actual
living together find themselves essentially
incompatible and incapable of leading their
married lives together.
Dr. Dominick F. Chirico, psychiatrist:
There are couples who possess sufficient
power of discretion or maturity of judg-
ment, but who, relative to each other, are
so essentially incompatible that they are in-
capable of leading a married life, incapable
of perpetuity, incapable of fidelity. How-
ever, they still may be able to accomplish
this with someone else.
Dr. Walter J. Coville, psychologist: There
are couples who have good discretionary
powers and are capable of sane judgment
with regard to the marriage contract. How-
ever, their basic nature involves psycho-
pathology that contraindicates their ability
to maintain harmony, perpetuity or fidelity
in marriage.
Dr. William S. Davis, Jr., psychiatrist: In
answer to your question [Are there couples
where both parties would actually possess
sufficient power of discretion or maturity
of judgment but who, relative to each other
are so essentially incompatible that they
would be incapable of leading a married
life, incapable of perpetuity, or of fidelity?]
I feel that you are absolutely correct. On
the other hand, if such a marriage remains,
it is because both parties are equally ill
(from a psychopathological point of view).
Either the personalities complement what
is lacking in the other or they play into
each other in a sort of double bond para-
sitic way. For them it is a game. This mar-
riage would never terminate. Unhappy they
would be together but equally unhappy
they would be apart. An example of this
type of situation would be two sado-maso-
chistic characters. If by chance one of the
persons is relatively healthy, he or she
would not be able to tolerate the other.
They would be incompatible.
Dr. Edward F. Falsey, psychiatrist: It
would appear that there are instances in
which both parties are so essentially incom-
patible that they are incapable of leading a
married life, incapable of perpetuity and of
fidelity. It is conceivable that they could
marry other persons but could not marry
each other.
Dr. Frederic L. Gannon, psychiatrist: I
seriously doubt the individual parties pos-
sess sufficient power of discretion if it does
result in incompatibility . . . the issue of
incompatibility or inability to sustain a ma-
ture relationship rests on the level of psy-
chological development of the parties in-
volved.
Dr. Pasquale D. Lotesta, psychiatrist: There
are personalities that are incompatible in
that they are incapable of leading normal
married life but in other areas do possess
sufficient power of discretion or maturity
of judgment. It is conceivable that they
could marry other persons and be compat-
ible.
Dr. Leon Olinger, psychiatrist: Your sec-
ond question involves the concept of 'essen-
tial incompatibility.' Do you mean by this,
basic, unchangeable and irrevocable incom-
patibility? If yes, I am not sure it exists.
Theoretically, individuals are capable of
modifying and changing this behavior. By
means of psychotherapy, adults can learn
to free themselves from the shackles of
childish, immature behavior patterns and
develop mature, more adult forms of func-
tioning. Two people who are "incompat-
ible" at one time largely because they meet
each other for immature or unhealthy neu-
rotic reasons, may conceivably, through
treatment, learn that they would prefer
each other to any other. Similarly, people
who are dissatisfied in one relationship be-
cause of unfulfilled neurotic needs, are
likely to find themselves incompatible in
another relationship.
Dr. John B. Scanlan, psychiatrist: It is
conceivable that parties to an incompatible
marriage could validly marry other persons.
Dr. John Deuel Sullivan, psychiatrist: On
the whole, I have some pessimism about
the usefulness of the incompatibility thesis
as a basis for annulment. At the present
time it seems to me that it would have to
be more or less a post hoc argument. ...
Now we'll make some effort to be respon-
sive to your questions. The first has to do
with people who have good discretion but
may actually be essentially incompatible to
each other in permanence and exclusivity.
It is conceivable that such people could
validly marry other persons but cannot get
along with each other. . . . It may very
well be that one or both lacked due discre-
tion and capacity for permanency, exclu-
sivity and prolixity, but it can still be that
people with individual psychopathology can
make satisfactory marriages. I agree that
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psychological testing and psychiatric eval-
uation has established incompatibility in at
least a few cases.
Dr. Francis C. Bauer, psychiatrist: There
is absolutely no doubt that the married
state permits a considerable amount of
neurotic interaction. In many instances,
states of adjustment, which could have been
reached in the single state, are not possible
because of the limits imposed by the con-
tract regarding personal freedom. Accord-
ingly, neurotic traits may impinge upon
one another, establishing an entirely new
dynamic. . . . If the neurotic traits of the
partners feed each other in the marriage,
they may continue to be sick but compat-
ible and, indeed, may find mutual assis-
tance. If the traits are not congruent how-
ever, the marriage is doomed to failure.
OUR THESIS: ESSENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY
CAN CAUSE NULLITY
From the above we believe that one can
justifiably conclude that essential incom-
patibility does exist, that there are couples
who are incapable of living a common life
together, at least as psychiatrists consider
essential incompatibility and as they under-
stand common life. We need not hold abso-
lutely that our experts' use of "essential"
means precisely what we, as canonists,
mean by "essential" in the canonical sense
nor that their understanding of "common
life" is the same as our notion of "common
life." At least for the purpose of this paper,
we are going to restrict our canonical defi-
nition of "common life" to basic common
conjugal or marital life, i.e., the actual use
of marital intercourse. Nevertheless, the
statements of the experts, including their
principles and their examples of possible
cases of "essential incompatibility" show
that they are convinced that there are cases
ESSENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY
of such basic, deep and broad incompati-
bility that we are certainly justified in say-
ing that at least in some of these psychiatric
cases there would be present inability to
fulfill the canonically essential elements of
a valid marriage.
There is one exception to the conclusion
drawn above. This is the opinion of Dr.
Leon Olinger who states that he is not cer-
tain that "basic, unchangeable and irrevo-
cable incompatibility exists." He believes
that two people who are incompatible at
one time may conceivably, through therapy,
come to the conclusion that they prefer to
remain with each other. However, the
question still remains as to how much ther-
apy would be required in such a case.
Could the condition be considered "cur-
able" and therefore not perpetual if it re-
quired extensive therapy over a number of
years? In some cases reported to our Tri-
bunal psychotherapy was unsuccessful even
after periods of 10 and 20 years. Even ac-
cepting Dr. Olinger's example, we might
still find that the marriage is invalid.
Our thesis is that if essential incompati-
bility exists because of relative constitu-
tional incapacity to lead a "common life,"
and if this relative constitutional incapacity
exists at the time of the marriage and is
incurable with a reasonable amount of ther-
apy, the marriage is invalid. For canonical
purposes, a definition with which all might
agree at the present time, "common life" is
at least the ability to lead a conjugal life,
i.e., to engage in marital intercourse in a
human fashion. Experience shows that
when two people are essentially incompat-
ible in the sense understood by psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists, there frequently
arises between them such a strong aversion
to each other that marital intercourse be-
tween them becomes impossible, again in
a human fashion, i.e., with due regard for
the dignity of the two persons as human
beings. Relative constitutional incapacity,
as we have described it, excludes any fur-
ther possibility of the proper exercise of
the ius in corpus when the open antag-
onism eventually becomes evident to both
parties.
Under the conditions specified, because
two specific incompatible persons might be
incapable of maritally living together in a
permanent manner, they would be incapa-
ble at the time of the marriage of exchang-
ing permanent rights to acts suitable for the
generation of children. Permanence or in-
dissolubility is rendered impossible because
of the relative constitutional incapacity ex-
isting at the time of the marriage. At the
time of the marriage contract, the "two in-
compatibles" were incapable of giving to
each other and accepting from each other
permanent rights to marital acts because
already at the time of the contract they had
a relative constitutional incapacity to fulfill
those rights in a permanent manner. They
could not oblige themselves to do what
they were then and there incapable of do-
ing-of living a permanent conjugal life
together-"until death do us part." Nemo
potest ad impossibile obligari.
Constituents of Proof
By analogy with the elements of proof
required to establish relative impotence ac-
cording to Canon 1086, we state the fol-
lowing are required for proof:
1) Both parties to the marriage have a
radical constitutional personality defect.
The radical personality defect of each party,
although often serious, need not be as se-
rious as when the alleged nullity is to be
based on the personality of only one party.
2) The defects must have been present
at the time of the marriage. Most fre-
quently proof of this is not difficult because
personalities do not readily change, espe-
cially without therapy.
3) The defects-or better the resulting
personalities-in both parties, must be per-
manent (at least incurable with reasonable
means).
4) The two defective personality struc-
tures must interact or clash in such a way
that conjugal life (the required ius in cor-
pus) becomes humanly impossible. If
eventually it is established that the ability
to love and to give mutual help and assis-
tance are essential parts of the marriage
contract, it would be sufficient to establish
that the personalities clash in such a man-
ner as to render love and mutual assistance
impossible. 17
The Proof
All of the experts who have advised us
are of one mind that if essential incompat-
ibility exists, sufficient external criteria
should be available to satisfy the reason-
able demands of the laws of evidence. They
do not agree in all details as to what these
external criteria should be. All agree that
psychological testing in depth of both par-
ties by a competent psychologist is most
helpful; some say that such testing is neces-
sary and should never be omitted; others
say that a thorough clinical evaluation of
17 See infra p. 183.
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both parties by a competent psychiatrist
would be sufficient in many cases. In this
regard an interesting question arises. Would
the clinical findings from the psychological
testing be considered sufficient proof? If
these give sufficient objective criteria,
should not the qualified psychologist be
considered an expert? We think he should
be. However, we also think that a psychi-
atrist, making use of the psychologist's find-
ings and conclusions and integrating them
with facts supplied by witnesses and per-
haps other documents, may at times be of
added assistance, especially in proving that
the condition antedated the marriage.
The fact that two parties to a marriage
have separated within a short time of their
marriage after much arguing, bickering,
etc., should be a sign for the canonical at-
torney that he might be dealing with a case
of essential incompatibility and that a fur-
ther study in depth by professional men
might be helpful. Our experts have advised
us that there are no "easy" criteria to rec-
ognize essential incompatibility, but that
early sexual incompatibility, withdrawal of
the parties into themselves with the avoid-
ance of social contacts, neglect of impor-
tant family responsibilities might suggest to
the inexperienced that essential incompat-
ibility might be present.
Examples of Essential Incompatibility
Certainly there are many cases of essen-
tial incompatibility where common life be-
comes impossible because of the very seri-
ous personality defect of only one of the
parties, e.g., schizophrenia, sociopathy,
nymphomania, satyriasis, chronic alcohol-
ism, severe neuroses, etc. While all of these,
at least in their fully developed stages, are
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themselves considered grounds for nullity,
it might be (at least in some cases) that
the nullity is present precisely because these
conditions make common life impossible.
It might also be that in some cases essen-
tial incompatibility might be easier to prove
than the "lack of due discretion." Objective
criteria for due discretion are not always
easy to establish. In addition, some indi-
viduals might cooperate in an "incompati-
bility" action more readily than in an ac-
tion where their own "due discretion" was
being questioned.
We have been advised by our experts
that generally two mature people are able
to adapt themselves to the minor differ-
ences which arise between them. Incom-
patibility results when one or both suffer
from personality defects, especially imma-
turity. Thus, it has been pointed out that
opposing trends, as an overly dependent
person with an overly aggressive person, or
an overly detached person with an overly
aggressive person, can result in incompati-
bility. Similar trends can also cause incom-
patibility as in the case of two aggressive
persons who compete and fight against
each other. In this case, the possession of
the same trait may antagonize the other.
In such cases, the differences between the
two people may be so great that there can-




Lack of Due Discretion
Where essential incompatibility is caused
primarily by such severe personality defects
as schizophrenia, manic-depressive psycho-
sis, chronic alcoholism, severe neuroses,
etc., it is evident that the "lack of due dis-
cretion" might also be present and be prov-
able. In the present paper, we have elimi-
nated these grounds from our discussion,
deliberately restricting ourselves to a con-
sideration of such marriages where the two
parties find themselves essentially incom-
patible but possibly could enter compatible
marriages with other spouses. Does the
very fact that two incompatible parties
marry necessarily indicate that one or both
of them lacked the necessary "due discre-
tion" for a marriage? This remains a dis-
puted question. Some experts claim that
two incompatible partners, both enjoying
due discretion, can make an honest mistake
in the choice of a partner. Others state that
in the case of essential incompatibility the
parties because of their immaturity have a
marked lack of understanding-blind spots
-with the result that neither can see the
other's position. Such lack of understand-
ing is also present and affects the choice of
a mate. Does this eliminate the usefulness
of an action based on essential incompati-
bility? We think not. The standards of "due
discretion" used by the psychiatrist might
differ from those required by canonical jur-
isprudence. Secondly, essential incompati-
bility might be more easy to prove than
"lack of due discretion." In recent months
"lack of due discretion" cases have met in-
creased disfavor in jurisprudence at the
Rota. There is always the possibility that
a case might have to face such an appeal.
Could the Concept of the
"Essential Elements" of
Marriage Be Broadened?
Before going into this particular ques-
tion, we believe that, at least theoretically,
invalidity could result from relative consti-
tutional incapacity because the persons
would not be capable of fulfilling an essen-
tial element of marriage-an element, that
is, which is recognized by all to be essen-
tial to marriage. In other words, to have
such grounds for invalidity, we do not feel
that the essential object of marriage neces-
sarily must be enlarged. However, in ana-
lyzing possible cases of this nature (rela-
tive constitutional incapacity) we do ob-
serve that often it is evident that what are
termed the "secondary ends" of marriage
are certainly not being fulfilled. Conse-
quently, a real question arises as to whether
the individuals taken together are even able
to fulfill these secondary ends. Therefore, it
seems appropriate to touch on this point
in considering the legal aspects of our pres-
ent discussion.
A question then could be, is that list of
"essential" elements which limits itself to
the ius in corpus, to permanence and to
exclusiveness actually too limited? Should
one consider the "mutual help" of Canon
1013 as also essential to a real marriage?
Certainly this "end" of marriage is more
than of simply "great value" to marriage.
It is an end of marriage as marriage is
constituted by God and nature.
It seems that one of the reasons for our
problem is that we do not have in the Code
a precise definition of marriage. The Code
does, however, give some elements of a
definition.' 8 Yet, traditionally canonical
jurisprudence before the Code did have
18 See Canons 1012, 1013, 1081, 1082 (espe-
cially Canon 1013 which deals with the ends and
properties of marriage).
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something of a definition-one accepted
from Roman Law. Justinian's definition of
marriage was: "Nuptiae autem, sive matri-
monium, est viri et mulieries coninuctio,
individuam vitae consuetudinem conti-
nens."'19 In other words, marriage is a
union of a man and a woman that contains
within it an indivisable intimacy or way of
life. This was accepted by Gratian20 and
by Pope Gregory IX.2I The definition im-
plies that more than the ius in corpus is
part of the essential object of marriage. In
discussing the formal object of marriage,
there is an interesting sentence in one of
the Rota decisions previous to the Code
"objectum vero formale et essentiale huius
contractus, praeter mutuum vitae adiutor-
ium, est potestas, seu ius . . . in corpus ad
coeundum.'"22 The formal and essential ob-
ject of this contract, besides mutual help
for life, is the power or right to normal
sexual acts.
When the Code speaks of the secondary
ends of marriage, it is not by calling them
"secondary" certainly and clearly saying
that they are not essential to marriage.
Therefore, one is led to ask whether if the
secondary ends, absolutely and perma-
nently cannot be fulfilled by the parties,
would we have a real marriage? Is not mu-
tual help something of a reflection of God's
judgment that "it is not good for man to be
alone." This was the reason for creating
19 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, bk. 1, tit. 9,
line I (5th ed., J. Moyle transl. 1949).
20 Decretum in Gratiani, dictum ante c.1,
C.XXVII, q. 2.
21 Decretales Greg. IX, c.11, X, de presumpt.,
II, 23.
22 6 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 208 (1914).
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woman to be man's "helpmate." But by
also giving woman to man as man's "wife,"
certainly did not mean that she would be
less his helpmate-rather she would be to-
tally, more intimately and permanently such
a "helpmate." Whatever might be said on
this point by Scriptures scholars, certainly
in the factual order-in the order of
present human nature, the order which
marriage is now to take care of-mutual
help is undoubtedly more than of "addi-
tional" value.
For many years now the general need
for cohabitation and a community of bed
and board have been viewed to be only
required for the "integrity and perfection"
of conjugal life. The ius in corpus, was
the "essential" object of the contract. But
is the ius in corpus the only essential
object? When persons enter marriage they
contract for a life together-a marital life.
They intend to give and to accept an affec-
tion of life that is called marital-the af-
fectio maritalis of Roman Law. This
affectio maritalis is a distinct thing-
very different from, for example, aflectio
concubinaria which in some basic way
pertains to the same material acts. It has a
more total aspect to it. Marital life, pre-
cisely as marital, means a community or
a society that will in a continued and ex-
clusive way assist the two persons to ful-
fill their basic human needs and to develop
themselves as persons. Marriage then, con-
sidered as a state of life, requires from the
viewpoint of subject, a person capable of
living in this society of marriage. As was
said before, if a person cannot give con-
sent (because of serious mental illness)
then he contracts invalidly because the
marriage, considered in its act of celebra-
tion (matrimonium in fieri) is defective.
But if a person cannot live out the society
that real marriage demands, then he is
incapable of "being married," of being
able to "create" the society of marriage,
of being one of the "necessary constitu-
ents" of a factual marriage (matrimonium
in facto esse). People marry to help them-
selves live a certain kind of good life.
Through marriage they should find assis-
tance in bearing their problems, in devel-
oping their good points, in being able to
use their talents, assistance in facing dif-
ficulties that will normally arise in life, and
help in fulfilling their part in the raising
of children that might be born. If instead
of such assistance and help, constant and
across the board opposition is the normal
experience, then one of the real God-given
ends of marriage is impossible and whether
that end is secondary or primary (or
whether the two ends are equally impor-
tant) it is still an end of marriage as
nature of God instituted marriage. A per-
son does not intend to enter what might
be considered half a marriage contract.
They are accepting marriage as it is in
toto, as it is supposed to be in the prac-
tical order. Therefore, these persons, be-
fore anything else, should be able to so
accept and fulfill marriage.
Using other terms, marriage as classical
Roman Law considered it, is a domestic
union of a man and a woman. Specifically
as "domestic" it demands in a person at
least the capability of being such, namely
that one can function in such a way that
he can form, build up, establish a home,
"a domus" in its general and basic human
aspects. If one deliberately does not do
this, that of course is an entirely different
question. Still he would be able to do it.
We feel that this idea is more than implied
by Canon 1082, which states that the
necessary "knowledge" for marriage is that
it is a permanent "society" between man
and woman.23 Just as after puberty such
"knowledge" is presumed to be present,24
so too, we might say it is presumed that
the individual after puberty is able basi-
cally to live out such a "society" as well.
Clearly this would broaden our possible
areas of invalidity. Going back for a mo-
ment, we see that as the ius in corpus
is essential (as are also the essential prop-
erties of that ius, namely perpetuity and
exclusiveness), then a person who is in-
capable of fulfilling some or all of these
aspects cannot contract validly. But what
if mutual help were also essential? Would
it not also follow that this essential ele-
ment would have its own essential "prop-
erties" of individuality and permanence?
In this hypothesis the inability to fulfill this
end and/or the properties related to it
would also invalidate a marriage. Why?
Well, it appears to us that first it would
have to be shown that the secondary end
was also essential. For the moment, we
will accept the traditional distinction be-
tween primary and secondary ends since
the matter in question can be argued we
believe in that context and should the dis-
tinction be changed in the future, our
argument would be just as valid. There is
23 Canon 1082, § 1.
24 Canon 1082, § 2.
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a statement in a 1938 Rotal decision
coram Jullien that holds just this. "'inis
vero primarius et secundarius uterque est
finis operis, seu finis matrimonii debitus,
essentialis, matrimonio intrinsecus.'' 25 In
other words, the secondary end of mar-
riage is also an end of marriage itself
(finis operis) in distinction to an addi-
tional end of the one entering marriage
(finis operantis) and this end is not only
intrinsic to marriage but essential. It would
appear justifiable then to say that as there
is an essential object related to the primary
and essential end of marriage, so too there
is an essential object related to the sec-
ondary and essential end. The primary end
of marriage is children and the essential
object of the contract related to that end
is the "ius in corpus". If a person cannot
(e.g., because of impotence) fulfill this
essential object then he is not a proper
subject of marriage. The secondary end of
marriage is mutal help and we could say
that the essential object of the contract re-
lated to that end is the "right to a shared
life" (common life, in that sense) or the
''right to a sharing of each others lives."
Likewise, then if a person cannot (e.g.,
because of radical personality incapacity)
fulfill this other essential object, he would
not be a proper subject of marriage.
Admittedly it would be very difficult-
at least at first-to decide and to define
what are the essential constituents of "mu-
tual help" or of a "shared life," but that
does not deny the value of trying to deter-
mine the constituents of these things as
25 30 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 344 (1938).
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well as the precise relationship of mutual
help to "essential object" of marriage.
Some statements in section 50 of the
Constitution, Gaudium et Spes of the Sec-
ond Vatican Council seem to imply that
the marriage contract essentially obliges
the parties to mutual help and assistance
and to a common life. It will be noticed
that in the new rite for the sacrament of
marriage the parties explicitly promise to
love and honor each other. Should not
such an explicit promise be considered
part of the essence of the contract? 26
20 For a lengthy discussion by one who believes
that the essence of the marriage contract has not
been changed by Gaudium et Spes we refer to
Pio Fedele, the director of Ephemerides luris
Canonici. See 23 Ephemerides luris Canonici 50-
134 (1967).
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